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[T]he privacy and dignity of our citizens [are] being whittled away by
sometimes imperceptible steps. Taken individually, each step may be of
little consequence. But when viewed as a whole, there begins to emerge a
society quite unlike any we have seen — a society in which government
may intrude into the secret regions of a [person’s] life at will.1
INTRODUCTION
2

John Roe, until recently, was a police officer for the city of San
Diego; that is, until his supervising sergeant discovered that in his free
time John enjoyed stripping off a police uniform, masturbating in
front of a video camera, and selling the resulting pornography on
eBay.3 Not surprisingly, the San Diego Police Department (“SDPD”)
demanded that John cease and desist in producing or distributing any
materials of a sexually explicit nature, believing that such off-duty
conduct not only violated a number of internal police regulations but
also adversely impacted the SDPD’s mission and functions.4 The
SDPD fired John when he did not completely cease his explicit
extracurricular activities as ordered.5 In a per curiam decision from
the October 2004 term, the United States Supreme Court held that the
SDPD did not deny John Roe’s right to free expression under the First
Amendment, as he was not expressing himself on a “matter of public
concern.”6
Putting aside the lurid nature of this case of the pornographic
policeman, John Roe raises significant constitutional questions
regarding the extent to which the government may condition public
employment on which activities employees decide to undertake in
their private and personal lives.7 Traditionally, under the doctrine of

Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 343 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
“John Roe” is a fictitious name given to the plaintiff in the case of City of San
Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 78 (2004) (per curiam). So that the reader does not confuse
San Diego v. Roe with the more well-known case of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
this paper refers to the former as John Roe.
3 See John Roe, 543 U.S. at 78.
4 Id. at 78-79, 84.
5 Id. at 79.
6 Id. at 84-85.
7 The fact that the federal constitutional issues raised herein apply directly only
to public employment should in no way diminish the significance of these legal issues.
There are over 21 million federal, state, and local government employees in the United
States, who make up roughly 16.5% of the nation’s workforce. See JOSEPH R. GRODIN,
JUNE M. WEISBERGER & MARTIN H. MALIN, PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND
1
2
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unconstitutional conditions, the Supreme Court limits the
government’s ability to condition governmental benefits, including
public employment, on the basis of individuals forfeiting their
constitutional rights.8 Indeed, the Supreme Court most often applies
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to scrutinize employment
terminations of, or other adverse employment actions taken against,
public employees for exercising their First Amendment free speech
rights.9
In the First Amendment context, the Court developed the wellhoned, if not entirely satisfactory, Connick/Pickering doctrinal analysis.
Taken together, Connick v. Myers and Pickering v. Board of Education
forbid public employers from taking adverse employment actions
against employees for speaking out on “matters of public concern”
unless, under a constitutional balancing test, the governmental
interest in efficiency outweighs the employee’s First Amendment
rights.10 Indeed, the Supreme Court dismissed John Roe’s case against
the SDPD under this First Amendment analysis.11

MATERIALS 1 (2004); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
2004-2005 298, tbl.453 (2005) (listing figures for 2002).
8 See Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions
in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 2-3 (2001).
9 See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972).
Since Perry, the
Supreme Court decided a number of these First Amendment public employment
cases. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006); Rankin v. McPherson,
483 U.S. 378 (1987) (applying unconstitutional conditions doctrine to uphold adverse
employment actions taken against deputy district attorney for engaging in
unsanctioned official-capacity speech); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)
(applying doctrine in upholding termination of assistant district attorney who
distributed unsanctioned inter-office questionnaire); Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch.
Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (applying doctrine to hold that public employee may
express her views in private to employer and still be protected by First Amendment);
Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (applying
doctrine to teacher who engaged in protected First Amendment activity, but finding
that teacher could still be validly fired for reasons unrelated to that protected activity).
10 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 143 (establishing, as threshold matter, that public
employee speech must involve “matter of public concern” in order to come under
protection of First Amendment); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)
(balancing “interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees”).
11 See John Roe, 543 U.S. at 83-85. Of course, in John Roe, the Supreme Court did
not need to engage in a constitutional balancing act, as John’s conduct did not meet
the threshold public concern test. See id.
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Nevertheless, the recent Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v.
Texas,12 which struck down a Texas anti-sodomy statute, recognizes a
more robust “liberty interest”13 in forming one’s identity through
meaningful human relationships in one’s personal and private life.
Indeed, Lawrence drastically alters the constitutional landscape as to
when the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions should come into
play in the public employment context. This is because, in Lawrence,
the Supreme Court construed an individual’s liberty interest in
decisional non-interference in private affairs14 as a preferred interest
that is due a heightened form of rational basis review.15 Consequently,
a previously neglected aspect of Lawrence is that it almost certainly
trumpets the beginning of a new era of greater privacy protection for
public employees by no longer permitting government employers to
terminate an employee merely because that employee does not live up

539 U.S. 558 (2003).
The focus on “liberty interests” rather than “privacy rights” is consistent with
the fact that Justice Kennedy utilizes the word “liberty” much more in his opinion for
the court than the more amorphous “privacy” language. My guess is that his choice in
this regard was purposeful as he sought to anchor this newly minted interest in the
concrete liberty language of the substantive component of the Due Process Clause.
Accord Randy E. Barnett, Correspondence, Grading Justice Kennedy: A Reply to
Professor Carpenter, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1582, 1589 (2005) (“The fact that Justice
Kennedy does not [announce a fundamental right to privacy] — that this doctrinal
dog does not bark — makes Lawrence in my view a ‘potentially revolutionary’ libertyprotecting case.”); Erin Daly, The New Liberty, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 221, 233 (2005)
(“Both Casey and Lawrence self-consciously shift the focus of substantive due process
away from privacy and back toward its textual anchor, liberty. This avoids the
principal objection to the Court’s post-Griswold privacy jurisprudence — that it lacks
textual support.”); see also Note, Unfixing Lawrence, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2858, 2868
(2005) (arguing that there “is a . . . strategic equivocation between privacy and
liberty” in Lawrence to advance, “whether knowingly or not, a strategically powerful
complex. The two terms of the complex sustain and limit one another”).
14 See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 491 (2006)
(“Decisional interference involves the government’s incursion into the data subject’s
decisions regarding her private affairs.”) (emphasis added); see also Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (finding one form of privacy consisting of “interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions”).
15 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
Although not every jurist and commentator
agrees that Lawrence applies more than a traditional rational basis review to rights of
decisional non-interference in private affairs, the vast majority do. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of Disgust and
Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1012 (2005) (“[F]ew constitutional scholars think
the narrowest or the broadest reading of Lawrence is correct. Its charged reasoning
cannot be limited to the sodomy context alone, but neither does it entail same-sex
marriage.”).
12
13
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to the employer’s conception of morality in how she lives her private
and personal life (especially in matters pertaining to sex).16
This paper argues that Lawrence signals the fulfillment of a certain
constitutional tradition initiated by Justice Louis Brandeis in his
eloquent dissent in Olmstead v. United States,17 most recently revived
in the joint opinion of three Justices in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,18 and, for the first time, adopted by
a majority of the Court in Lawrence.19 As a result, the current
Connick/Pickering First Amendment framework, which focuses on the
nature of the speech or expression engaged in by the employee, must
be recast to be more readily applicable to the Lawrence substantive due
process context. This article therefore proposes a restructured
constitutional balancing analysis, the “modified Pickering analysis,” to
more appropriately weigh the interests at stake in such cases: the
public employee’s interest in decisional non-interference in private
affairs and the employer’s interest in running an efficient
governmental service.20
In order to concretely demonstrate how the modified Pickering
analysis will apply to the liberty interests announced in Lawrence, this
article revisits the Supreme Court’s decision in City of San Diego v.
Roe. In this regard, this paper concludes that John Roe would most
likely have been decided in the same manner under this modified
analysis because of heightened governmental efficiency concerns and
John Roe’s relatively minimal substantive due process rights under the
circumstances.21 Nevertheless, and as highlighted by a number of
hypotheticals discussed below, the constitutional balancing of relevant

16 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (observing “emerging awareness that liberty gives
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives
in matters pertaining to sex”); State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 34-35 (Kan. 2005)
(finding, based on Lawrence, that moral disapproval of group cannot be legitimate
government interest).
17 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
18 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (joint
opinion).
19 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
20 To be clear, although this new test is denominated the “modified Pickering
analysis,” this test is not meant to apply to First Amendment public employee
disputes. For those cases, the Connick/Pickering line still applies. This modified
analysis is only for weighing public employees’ substantive due process rights postLawrence against an employers’ legitimate efficiency concerns. It is because of the fact
that Pickering first established the constitutional balancing of interests in this context
that this new test has been so named.
21 See infra Part IV.A.2.
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interests in future substantive due process cases will certainly lead to
public employees having greater legal protection from arbitrary
interference by government employers into their private affairs.22
This article presents the emergence of these post-Lawrence public
employee interests in decisional non-interference in private affairs,
and the concomitant modified Pickering test, in five parts. Part I will
discuss the historical foundations of the Supreme Court’s maddening
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and, in particular, the unique
character of those unconstitutional conditions cases in which the
government acts in its capacity as an employer. Part II will then
review the development of substantive due process jurisprudence in
the privacy context over the last century and describe how Lawrence
represents the fulfillment of an expansive view of these constitutional
rights in the form of the interest in decisional non-interference in
private affairs. Based on this new constitutional development, Part III
will propose a modified version of the Pickering test, which
simultaneously discards the Connick public concern test and more
appropriately, from the start, weighs public employees’ interests in
decisional non-interference in private affairs against government
employers’ efficiency concerns. Finally, in an attempt to discern the
analytical strengths and weaknesses of this new test, Part IV will apply
the modified Pickering analysis to the John Roe case and some real
world public employee cases and hypothetical scenarios.
I.

THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS IN PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT

To begin to understand the inadequacy of the existing
unconstitutional conditions doctrine in public employment regarding
public employees’ substantive due process rights post-Lawrence, it is
first necessary to explore the legal boundaries of the current doctrine.
The following three sections undertake a brief analysis of the historical
foundations of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, analyze the
Connick/Pickering line of public employee free speech cases, and
finally highlight the peculiar lack of unconstitutional conditions in
employment cases outside of the First Amendment.
A. A Brief Introduction to the Historical Foundations of the Doctrine
Historically, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions first
enjoyed widespread use in the early part of the 20th century when the
22

See infra Part IV.B.
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Lochner Court23 developed economic substantive due process.24 Under
economic substantive due process, the Lochner Court emphasized
property rights and the freedom to contract.25 During the zenith of
this period, the Court held that states could not condition corporate
privileges upon the forfeiture of economic substantive due process
rights.26 This limitation on the government’s ability to use its various
powers to limit individual’s constitutional rights was, in hindsight, the
first incarnation of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
With the “switch in time that saved nine”27 and the ascendancy of
President Roosevelt’s New Deal Court in the late 1930s and early
1940s, however, the Lochner era came to an abrupt halt.28 In the
ensuing period, a new Supreme Court abolished much of the Lochner
Court’s economic substantive due process jurisprudence and, as a
23 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) (utilizing substantive due
process analysis to strike down maximum hour laws for bakers because of its
“arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty”),
overruled in part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963), and Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423, 425 (1952).
24 The Lochner Court constitutionalized property rights and the liberty to contract
under a theory of economic substantive due process as a means to strike down much
social welfare legislation during the first part of the 20th century. See, e.g., Adair v.
United States, 208 U.S. 161, 171, 180 (1908) (invalidating federal law prohibiting
interstate carriers from terminating workers for union membership), overruled in part
by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941). See generally Sujit
Choudhry, The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1
(2004) (providing comprehensive analysis of various meanings ascribed to Lochner
Era).
25 See, e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 561-62 (1923) (striking
down minimum wage law for women); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915)
(striking down Kansas statute that prohibited employers from conditioning
employment on employee’s agreement to refrain from joining labor organization);
Adair, 208 U.S. at 171, 180 (invalidating federal law prohibiting interstate carriers
from terminating workers for union membership).
26 Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of
Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 n.7 (1988) (“[Unconstitutional conditions first]
appear[] in Justice Bradley’s dissent in Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co., 94 U.S. 535,
543 (1876): ‘Though a State may have the power, if it sees fit to subject its citizens to
the inconvenience, of prohibiting all foreign corporations from transacting business
within its jurisdiction, it has no power to impose unconstitutional conditions upon
their doing so.’”).
27 See William H. Rehnquist, Judicial Independence, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 593-94
(2004) (quoting FRED R. SHAPIRO, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL
QUOTATIONS 393 (1933)).
28 Indeed, Lochner itself was eventually “implicitly rejected.” Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 597 (1977). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)
(“We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of
laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions.”).
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result, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions itself went through
a substantial period of disuse.29 Shortly thereafter, however, the
Warren Court of the 1950s and 1960s rescued the doctrine from the
dustbin of legal history and began to apply it to a number of cases
involving civil rights and civil liberties.30
Many of the more recent unconstitutional conditions cases involve
the government acting in its role as a sovereign,31 seeking to induce
certain preferred outcomes through use of government subsidies and
In these “government subsidy” cases, the
tax exemptions.32
government seeks to utilize its Spending Clause power33 to award
government largesse to individuals in return for their agreeing to
significant burdens on their “preferred rights,” especially their First
Amendment rights to speech, expression, and association.34
So from whence does this rejuvenated version of the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions derive? While not anchored in any single
29 See Kathleen A. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415,
1416 (1989).
30 See id.
31 As will be discussed in detail below, government can act either in its sovereign
or employer capacity. See infra Part I.B.1.
32 But see Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548-49 (2001)
(overturning regulation which would have conditioned government funding based on
legal services attorneys agreeing not to challenge the validity of existing welfare laws
for constitutional or statutory reasons); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468
U.S. 364, 402 (1984) (overturning § 399 of Corporation for Public Broadcasting Act,
which conditioned public broadcasting subsidies based on non-commercial
educational broadcasters agreeing not to editorialize); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 527-29 (1958) (overturning California law which sought to have all veterans
seeking certain tax exemption sign declaration that they did not advocate overthrow
of United States by force or violence or other unlawful means).
33 The Spending Clause of the United States Constitution states: “The Congress
shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States .
. . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Congress is allowed to provide incentives under its
Spending Clause powers, but it may not coerce federal funding recipients through this
power. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) (“[Congress may not
induce the recipient of federal funding] to engage in activities that would themselves
be unconstitutional.”).
34 A considerable amount of dissonance exists between two different groups of
Justices, and indeed there are two different schools of jurisprudential thought
concerning the application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in these socalled “government subsidy” cases. See Sullivan, supra note 29, at 1415-16 (noting
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is “a minefield to be traversed gingerly” and
“riven with inconsistencies”). Fortunately, this debate does not arise in employment
cases and, therefore, is beyond the scope of this article. For an in-depth discussion of
these cases, see generally Sullivan, supra note 29 and Berman, supra note 8.
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clause of the Federal Constitution, the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions has been called a “creature of judicial implication.”35 In its
simplest terms, the modern form of the doctrine prohibits the
government from conditioning a governmental benefit based on an
individual’s forfeiting a constitutional right under certain
circumstances.36 Although what the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine holds is generally uncontested, specifying the “certain
circumstances” under which the doctrine is thought to apply is a
completely different story.37
For instance, Dean Kathleen Sullivan attempts to limit the doctrine
to incursions into “preferred rights.”38 Professor Mitchell Berman, for
his part, believes that this is an unhelpful distinction because there is
generally much disagreement over what should and should not be a
preferred right.39
This paper follows Sullivan’s “conventional
formulation” regarding the scope of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine. Indeed, a cursory survey of the different types of cases in
which the doctrine has been applied over the years appears to track
mostly instances involving arguably “preferred” rights.40 For instance,
See Epstein, supra note 26, at 10.
See Berman, supra note 8, at 3 (“[I]t is now universally recognized that
[governmental] conditional offers are sometimes constitutionally permissible and
sometimes not. Indeed, correctly understood, that is all the famed and contentious
unconstitutional conditions doctrine holds.”); see also Sullivan, supra note 29, at
1421-22 (“Unconstitutional conditions problems arise when government offers a
benefit on condition that the recipient perform or forego an activity that a preferred
constitutional right normally protects from government interference.”).
37 See Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1304 (1984) (observing that unconstitutional
conditions decisions “manifest[] an inconsistency so marked as to make a legal realist
of almost any reader”).
38 See Sullivan, supra note 29, at 1421-22. For Sullivan, “preferred constitutional
rights” refer to rights normally protected by strict judicial review. Id. at 1427.
39 See Berman, supra note 8, at 9-10 (“[U]nder Dean Sullivan’s formulation — the
conventional formulation — the question of whether this liberty interest rises to a
constitutional right (or, as she puts it, a ‘preferred’ constitutional right) determines
not only whether the condition is unconstitutional, but whether the law even presents
an unconstitutional conditions problem. This is unfortunate, for whether a preferred
right is involved may prove controversial or uncertain . . . . ‘[P]referred rights’ . . . do
not come to our attention predefined.”).
40 It is true that Sullivan limits her theory “normally” to rights which receive strict
scrutiny. See Sullivan, supra note 29, at 1427. But there does not appear to be any
sound reason to differentiate between different forms of heightened scrutiny in the
unconstitutional conditions context. This is not to say there are not meaningful
distinctions between “mere liberty interests” protected by rational basis review and
“constitutional rights” protected by some form of heightened scrutiny, or even
perhaps between “non-preferred rights” that get some form of heightened review and
35
36
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courts applied the doctrine to First Amendment cases involving tax
exemptions,41 users of public facilities,42 recipients of government
subsidies,43 and government employees,44 and to Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment cases involving property takings and just compensation.45
All that being said, public employment is the legal context in which
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is most often applied. As
Professor Jason Mazzone aptly points out, “[p]ublic employment . . .
represents a constant opportunity for the government to persuade
individuals to give up certain First Amendment protections in
exchange for a regular paycheck.”46 It is thus to a more detailed
discussion of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in public
employment that this paper now turns.
B. Unconstitutional Conditions in Public Employment and the First
Amendment
As an initial matter, in unconstitutional conditions in employment
cases, the government retains much more leeway in interfering with
individual rights than it does when acting in the government subsidy
context described in the previous section.47 As a result, individuals in
these employment cases generally possess fewer speech and expression

“preferred rights” which are due strict judicial review. Rather, assuming one accepts
that the constitutional right involved is due some form of heightened review, it is
unimportant for the sake of the unconstitutional conditions analysis whether that
right is subject to “rational review with bite,” intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny.
See Paul M. Secunda, Lawrence’s Quintessential Millian Moment and Its Impact on the
Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 50 VILL. L. REV. 117, 133-36 (2005). That is,
the relevant inquiry is whether the particular liberty interest is sufficiently important
to the individual as to place on the government a demand for heightened justification
before it interferes with that interest. Accord Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[The liberty of the Due Process Clause] . . . recognizes, what
a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly
careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.”).
41 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958).
42 See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 384
(1993); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 169 (1972).
43 See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 366 (1984).
44 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 378 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 138 (1983).
45 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 825 (1987).
46 Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 810 (2003).
47 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1069 (2d
ed. 2002).
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protections under the First Amendment.48 To more fully understand
why this state of affairs exists in the context, this section proceeds by
first discussing the government’s unique status when it acts in an
employer capacity. This section next considers the Supreme Court’s
traditional recognition of this unique status through the
Connick/Pickering First Amendment analysis.
1.

The Unique Status of Government as Employer

Although most jurists once believed that government benefits,
including public employment, were mere privileges that could be
withheld or limited on any condition,49 the Supreme Court now
emphatically rejects “the greater includes the lesser” premise.50 In the
landmark public employment case, Keyishian v. Board of Regents, the
Supreme Court stated: “‘[T]he theory that public employment which
may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions,
regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.’”51 In
other words, the government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a
basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests —
especially, his interest in freedom of speech.”52 This is because if the
government could deny a benefit like public employment based on a
person’s exercise of a constitutional right, there is little doubt that the
exercise of that right would be inhibited; indeed, perhaps to the same

48 See Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions — A Research
Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 635 (1999) (“Under free speech law,
the government acting as employer has far more authority to restrict people’s speech
than does the government acting as sovereign.”).
49 While a judge on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Oliver Wendell
Holmes once famously said that, in the employment context, a person “may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman.” McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
50 See Mazzone, supra note 46, at 806 (“The doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions rejects the notion that the government’s power to grant a benefit includes
the lesser power to attach any conditions at all to receiving that benefit.”).
51 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 345 F.2d
236, 239 (2d Cir. 1965)); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)
(“For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a person
has no ‘right’ to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may
deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which
the government may not rely.”); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (“It is
too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be
infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.”).
52 See Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 597.
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extent as if the government directly commanded the person not to
engage in that constitutionally protected conduct in the first place.53
Yet even though the government employer does not possess
unfettered discretion when it comes to impinging upon the exercise of
its employees’ constitutional rights, it retains substantial latitude when
setting the terms and conditions of its employees’ employment, a
discretion which is not available in its dealing with the same
individuals as citizens.54 In this regard, Justice Marshall famously
stated in Pickering v. Board of Education: “[I]t cannot be gainsaid that
the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its
employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in
connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.”55
Although Justice Marshall in Pickering did not expressly support his
assertion, the Supreme Court on numerous occasions since reaffirmed
that government possesses significantly more authority over
individuals when acting in its employment capacity.56

53 Id. (“For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his
constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would
in effect be penalized and inhibited . . . . [And it would] ‘produce a result which (it)
could not command directly.’”) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526
(1958)).
54 See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006) (concluding that
public employee official capacity speech not protected by First Amendment in light of
increased disciplinary needs of government employer); Bd. of County Comm’rs v.
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (discussing disciplinary and efficiency needs of
government employer as reason for broader discretion when government acts in this
capacity); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671-72 (1994) (plurality opinion)
(explaining why government as employer has broader powers with regard to its citizen
than when acting in its sovereign capacity).
55 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (emphasis added); see also
Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 94 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The
restrictions that the Constitution places upon the government in its capacity as
lawmaker, i.e., as the regulator of private conduct, are not the same as the restrictions
it places upon the government in its capacity as employer.”).
56 See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718 (1994) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“We have . . . no one Free Speech Clause test. We have different tests
for content-based speech restrictions, for content-neutral speech restrictions, for
restrictions imposed by the government acting as employer, for restrictions in
nonpublic fora, and so on.”); Waters, 511 U.S. at 671-72 (plurality opinion) (“We
have never explicitly answered this question [about the government’s dual roles],
though we have always assumed that its premise is correct — that the government as
employer indeed has far broader powers than does the government as sovereign.”)
(citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983); Civil
Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973).

98

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 40:085

For example, in Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr,57 Justice
O’Connor explained that the government employer retains significant
discretion in terminating or sanctioning an employee given its
interests in running an efficient, efficacious, responsive, and noncorrupt public service.58 Similarly, Justice Powell explained in his
concurring opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy that the government in its role
as an employer must be given a wide berth in administering internal
personnel policies in order to be able to maintain an efficient and
disciplined workplace.59 Finally, in Waters v. Churchill, Justice
O’Connor further distinguished the two differing roles that
government undertakes. For instance, she explained that based on the
government’s needs in its employer capacity, certain First Amendment
doctrines are not reasonably applicable to government employees’

518 U.S. 668 (1996).
Id. at 674 (“The government needs to be free to terminate both employees and
contractors for poor performance, to improve the efficiency, efficacy, and
responsiveness of service to the public, and to prevent the appearance of
corruption.”); see also Waters, 511 U.S. at 674-75 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he extra
power the government has [as employer] . . . comes from the nature of the
government’s mission as employer. Government agencies are charged by law with
doing particular tasks. Agencies hire employees to help do those tasks as effectively
and efficiently as possible. When someone who is paid a salary so that she will
contribute to an agency’s effective operation begins to do or say things that detract
from the agency’s effective operation, the government employer must have some
power to restrain her.”); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional
Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1250 (1999) (“The government has instrumental or
programmatic goals within the domain of management. When acting there, it may
restrict individual autonomy in the service of its programmatic goals.”) (citing C.
Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1,
16-21 (1998)). Indeed, absent contractual, statutory, or constitutional restriction, the
government is entitled to terminate employees and contractors on an at-will basis, for
good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. See Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674.
59 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (“[T]he Government’s
interest . . . is the maintenance of employee efficiency and discipline. . . . To this end,
the Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and control over the
management of its personnel and internal affairs.”). If it were otherwise, Justice
Powell explains, the government employer would not be able to remove inefficient
and unsatisfactory workers quickly, and the government’s substantial interest in so
doing would be frustrated without adequate justification. Id.
57
58
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speech,60 and that less stringent procedural requirements appertain to
restrictions on such employees’ speech.61
Nevertheless, while it is generally agreed that the government holds
more power to interfere with individuals’ constitutional rights in its
employment capacity,62 it is difficult to determine the exact amount of
disruption employee speech or conduct must cause before the
government employer can intervene.63 The next section turns to this
difficult question.
2.

The First Amendment Speech and Expression Rights of Public
Employees: The Connick/Pickering Analysis

To determine whether the government employer is acting in a
“reasonable” manner and consistent with other constitutional contexts
involving “reasonableness” tests,64 the Supreme Court engages in a
constitutional balancing act.65 Justice Marshall set forth the applicable
balancing in Pickering: “The problem in any case is to arrive at a
balance between the interests of the [public employee], as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees.”66
Important
considerations in carrying out this balance include whether the
employee’s statements will impair discipline by superiors, harmony
60 See Waters, 511 U.S. at 672 (reviewing number of First Amendment doctrines
that do not apply with same force in government as employer context, including
instances in which employer “may bar its employees from using Mr. Cohen’s offensive
utterance to members of the public or to the people with whom they work”) (citing
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971)).
61 Id. at 673.
62 See, e.g., id. (observing that Court has “consistently given greater deference to
government predictions of harm used to justify restriction of employee speech than to
predictions of harm used to justify restrictions on the speech of the public at large”).
63 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983) (noting difficulty associated
with Pickering balance).
64 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342-43 (1985) (balancing test
utilized to show reasonableness in Fourth Amendment government search of public
school student’s purse); see also infra Part III.B.2 (discussing in detail Fourth
Amendment reasonableness test as applied to government employees).
65 See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 678 (1996).
66 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
Moreover, this
framework applies regardless of the public employee’s contractual or other claims to a
job. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). In this sense, First
Amendment claims based on the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions are distinct
from procedural due process claims which depend on whether the public employee is
thought to have a liberty or property interest in his or her employment. See id. at 599.
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among coworkers, close working relationships for which personal
loyalty and confidence are necessary, the performance of the
employee’s duties, or the enterprise’s regular operation.67
In Pickering, the Court applied this constitutional framework for
public employee First Amendment rights to a case involving a public
school teacher terminated after criticizing in a local newspaper
editorial a school district proposal to increase taxes, which the school
board and superintendent endorsed.68 Based on these circumstances,
the Court found that the balancing of interests came out in the
teacher’s favor because the statement concerned a matter of public
concern (i.e., whether the school system required additional funds)
and there was no evidence that the statement disrupted the teacher’s
relationship with coworkers, his own job duties, or the school’s
operation in general.69 In such an instance, the Court found that “it is
necessary to regard the [public school teacher] as the member of the
general public he seeks to be.”70
The 1983 case of Connick v. Myers, however, gave the Pickering
balancing test an important, and ambiguous, gloss.71 Although the
Court’s formulation in Pickering included the phrasing “a matter of
public concern,”72 Connick elaborated upon what counts as “a matter
of public concern.”73 In Connick, an assistant district attorney
circulated to coworkers a questionnaire concerning internal office
affairs in order to discover whether a general job satisfaction problem
existed in the New Orleans District Attorney’s office.74 Emphasizing
“the common sense realization that government offices could not
function if every employment decision became a constitutional
matter,”75 the Court ruled that even before a Pickering balance could
Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at
570-73).
68 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564.
69 Id. at 571-73. The Court also noted the import of allowing public employees to
speak out on matters of public concern because they are many times in the best
position to have “informed and definite opinions.” See id. at 572.
70 See id. at 574. Of course, regarding the public employee “as the member of the
general public he seeks to be” does not mean that government employees qualify for
the more stringent protections that apply to citizens when the government acts in its
sovereign capacity. See supra Part I.B.1.
71 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983).
72 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
73 See Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on
Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43, 47-50 (1988).
74 Connick, 461 U.S. at 140-41.
75 Id. at 143.
67
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occur, a court had to consider as a threshold matter whether the
public employee was speaking on a “matter of public concern.”76 In
other words, the Court made the public concern test the center of this
crucial inquiry based on its belief that all previous unconstitutional
conditions in employment cases centered on “the rights of public
employees to participate in public affairs.”77 Because the Court
concluded that most of the questionnaire circulated by Myers
concerned matters of private interest, rather than of public concern,78
it dismissed most of the plaintiff’s First Amendment claim at this
threshold level.79
While Connick explained the centrality of the public concern test to
the public employee free speech analysis, it provided little guidance as
to how to draw the lines between what is “a matter of public concern”
and what is a “matter of private interest.”80 All that Connick stated in
this regard was that “[w]hether an employee’s speech addresses a

76 Id. at 146 (“Pickering, its antecedents and progeny, lead us to conclude that if
[the] questionnaire cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter
of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her
discharge.”).
77 Id. at 144-45. Justice White explained for the majority that “[w]hen employee
expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in
managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the
First Amendment.” Id. at 146.
78 Id. at 154. The Court went out of its way to emphasize that public employee
speech on private matters does not constitute unprotected speech such as obscenity or
fighting words. See id. at 147. Nevertheless, “when a public employee speaks not as a
citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only
of personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the
appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a
public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee’s behavior.” Id.
79 Id. at 154.
As for the one question on the questionnaire that could be
characterized as a matter of public concern, the Court found that because of the
disruptive effect of this question on the workplace, the Pickering balance came out in
favor of the government. Id. As Randy Kozel has aptly commented, this disruption
theory of public employee speech is unsettling because “[s]uch a test is inconsistent
with the notion of robust exchange of divergent ideas, as it leaves vulnerable the
speech that is most likely to have a strong effect.”
See Randy J. Kozel,
Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 1018 (2005).
80 One issue that has been decided about the public concern test since Connick,
however, is that a statement made by a public employee in a private conversation
criticizing a political official may still be considered speech on a matter of “public”
concern. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 386-87 (1987); see also Givhan v.
W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979) (holding that public
employee may express her views in private to employer and still be protected by First
Amendment).
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matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form,
and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.”81
Consequently, Connick leaves much to be desired and demands further
clarification.82
Nevertheless, the substantial legal hurdles Connick imposed on
public employees become much more manageable in one subset of
cases and irrelevant in another. The first subset of cases involve
instances in which the employee speech is completely unrelated to his
or her public employment and is spoken on the employee’s own time,
but still qualifies as a matter of public concern.83 This type of case is
exemplified by United States v. National Treasury Employees Union
(“NTEU”),84 in which the federal government passed a law prohibiting
federal employees from receiving honoraria for making speeches or
writing articles.85 Significantly, the prohibition applied even though
the subject of the article did not have any connection to the
government employee’s employment.86
Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
It is therefore not surprising that a veritable cottage industry of academic
literature has attempted to make sense of this amorphous, unsatisfying test. See, e.g.,
Allred, supra note 73, at 75-81 (describing conflict and confusion surrounding public
concern test and proposing alternative standard); Kozel, supra note 79, at 1044-51
(putting forth internal/external model of public employee speech to replace current
Connick/Pickering approach); Paul Cerkvenik, Note, Who Your Friends Are Could Get
You Fired! The Connick “Public Concern” Test Unjustifiably Restricts Public Employees’
Associational Rights, 79 MINN. L. REV. 425, 445 (1994) (discussing confusion
surrounding whether public concern test applies to public employee freedom of
association cases); Karin B. Hoppmann, Note, Concern with Public Concern: Toward a
Better Definition of the Pickering/Connick Threshold Test, 50 VAND. L. REV. 993, 996
(1997) (stating that Connick Court failed to supply clear definition of public concern
and that test is flawed); Kermit Roosevelt, Note, The Costs of Agencies: Waters v.
Churchill and the First Amendment in the Administrative State, 106 YALE L.J. 1233, 1241
(1997) (criticizing vagueness of public concern test); D. Gordon Smith, Comment,
Beyond “Public Concern”: New Free Speech Standards for Public Employees, 57 U. CHI.
L. REV. 249, 255-64 (1990) (contending that problems surrounding public concern
test have led to undue restriction on public employees’ free speech rights).
83 Indeed, as early as Connick, the Court recognized that different factors might be
at play when the public employee speech involves off-duty, non-work related
activities. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 153 n.13 (citing NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S.
322 (1974)).
84 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
85 Id. at 457, 459.
86 Id. Examples of the plaintiffs’ speeches in this case include a mail handler who
wanted to give lectures on the Quaker religion, an aerospace engineer who lectured on
black history, and a microbiologist who wrote articles on dance performances. See id.
at 461-62. Importantly, the Court noted that these federal employees sought
compensation for their expressive activities in their capacity as citizens, not as
81
82
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Finding that the federal employees’ expressive activities fell within
the category of comment on matters of public concern,87 the Court
easily concluded under Pickering that the employees’ interests
outweighed those of the government.88 More interestingly, the Court
appears to be saying that even when speech is completely unrelated to
a public employee’s job, the public concern test is still the appropriate
test to apply.89 In other words, even when a public employee is acting
in her capacity as a citizen, under the First Amendment analysis, that
employee is still treated as a government employee if the speech
restriction is predicated upon the individual’s public employment.90
government employees, and these activities did not have any adverse impact on the
efficiency of the offices in which they worked. Id. at 465 (“Neither the character of
the authors, the subject matter of their expression, the effect of the content of their
expression on their official duties, nor the kind of audiences they address has any
relevance to their employment.”).
87 See id. at 466 (“Respondents’ expressive activities in this case fall within the
protected category of citizen comment on matters of public concern rather than
employee comment on matters related to personal status in the workplace. The
speeches and articles for which they received compensation in the past were addressed
to a public audience, were made outside the workplace, and involved content largely
unrelated to their government employment.”).
Interestingly, the dichotomy
seemingly set up by the Court in NTEU does not contemplate whether a government
employer can fire an employee for engaging in conduct outside of work not addressed
to a public audience and not on matters of public concern, such as the situation where
a public employee is fired for writing poetry on her own time. A literal reading of
Connick and NTEU would suggest that the poetry-writing employee would have no
constitutional protection, a seemingly absurd result. Such an employee might be
protected, however, under the proposed modified Pickering test for post-Lawrence
substantive due process rights. See infra Parts IV.B, V.B. The author particularly
wishes to thank Professor Mitch Berman for his insights on the issues discussed in this
footnote.
88 Furthermore, when Congress seeks to deter in a wholesale fashion a broad
category of expression, the burden on the government will be especially heavy. See
NTEU, 513 U.S. at 467; see also id. at 468 (“The widespread impact of the honoraria
ban . . . gives rise to far more serious concerns than could any single supervisory
decision.”). The Court also found that a prohibition on compensation for speech,
rather than on the speech itself, could cause just as much of a burden on an
employee’s expressive activity. See id. at 468.
89 Accord Kozel, supra note 79, at 1051 (observing that when employee speech in
question includes “indicia of the speaker’s employment, the proper analytical rubric
[is] the familiar Connick/Pickering two-step”); see also NTEU, 513 U.S. at 480
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The time-tested Pickering balance . . . provides the
governing framework for analysis of all manner of restrictions on speech by the
government as employer.”).
90 A possible alternative view would have permitted the employee, when speaking
as a citizen, to take advantage of the more stringent protections of the traditional First
Amendment analysis. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 157 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“When
public employees engage in expression unrelated to their employment while away
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In addition to this category of easily manageable public concern
cases represented by NTEU, the Supreme Court much more recently
determined that there is a second, perhaps even larger, subset of
public employee speech cases where one does not even need to
grapple with Connick’s public concern test. In Garcetti v. Ceballos,91
the Court discussed what constitutional protections, if any, are due to
a public employee when that employee speaks out publicly on matters
which are part of his job description.92 In Ceballos, a deputy district
attorney for Los Angeles County claimed that his public employer
retaliated against him by assigning him to less desirable work as a
result of his writing a memo criticizing the issuing of a warrant in a
criminal case.93
The Court found that since the deputy district attorney was not
speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern, but rather as an
employee of the government, Connick’s public concern test and the
constitutional balancing of interests under Pickering did not even need
to be reached.94 In this vein, writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy
found that were it otherwise, state and federal courts would be
constantly intruding into the realm of communications between and
among government employees and their superiors.95 Consequently,
“official capacity speech” after Ceballos is another category of public
employee free speech that is not subject to the vagaries of the Connick
public concern test. Unlike the cases represented by NTEU, however,
this subset of cases has the effect of lessening the First Amendment
protections for public employees.
The fact that public employee free speech rights have taken such a
substantial blow as a result of the Ceballos decision makes it all the
more important to identify other public employee constitutional rights
recognized by the Court in the past. But as the next section illustrates,
the Court has been reluctant, without apparent sufficient reason, to

from the work place, their First Amendment rights are, of course, no different from
those of the general public.”).
91 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
92 Id. at 1955 (“The question presented by the instant case is whether the First
Amendment protects a government employee from discipline based on speech made
pursuant to the employee’s official duties.”).
93 Id. at 1955-56.
94 Id. at 1960 (“We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from
employer discipline.”).
95 Id. at 1961.
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apply the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in employment
outside the First Amendment context.
C. The Peculiar Lack of Unconstitutional Conditions in Employment
Cases Outside of the First Amendment
As can be gathered from the intricate legal analysis described in the
previous section, the Supreme Court continues to spend a substantial
amount of time working out the contours of the First Amendment
speech rights of public employees. The same cannot be said of the
parameters of public employees’ constitutional rights outside of the
First Amendment. Although such cases do exist (most at the lower
federal court level with one exception),96 the Court applies mostly the
government-as-employer analysis in the First Amendment context.97
Of the few cases that do exist, some are highlighted by Justice
Scalia’s dissent in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, a political
affiliation case.98 For instance, in the Fourth Amendment context,
Justice Scalia noted that private citizens are not subjected to
governmental searches and seizures of their property without a
warrant supported by probable cause.
In contrast, in many
96 See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 245 (1976) (upholding hair length
regulations for police officers under substantive due process, noting, “If such state
regulations may survive challenges based on the explicit language of the First
Amendment, there is surely even more room for restrictive regulations of state
employees where the claim implicates only the more general contours of the
substantive liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Many more of
these cases have percolated through the lower federal courts throughout the years,
without much success for public employee plaintiffs. See, e.g., Akers v. McGinnis, 352
F.3d 1030, 1040-41 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that anti-fraternization rule not allowing
prison employees to associate with offenders off-duty did not violate employee’s
freedom of intimate association); Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1110 (11th Cir.
1997) (rehearing en banc) (upholding discharge of staff attorney of Georgia
Department of Law who was fired when employer learned of planned homosexual
marriage ceremony); Rathert v. Vill. of Peotone, 903 F.2d 510, 515-16 (7th Cir. 1990)
(finding that prohibiting police officers from wearing earrings off-duty rationally
related to permissible purpose); see also Steve Hartsoe, ACLU Challenges N.C.
Cohabitation Law, WASH. POST, May 10, 2005, at A06 (describing ACLU lawsuit filed
against Pender County, North Carolina for forcing sheriff dispatcher to quit her job
for violating state’s “adultery and fornication” law).
97 See Mazzone, supra note 46, at 810 (noting that “[t]he doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions has been most vigorously applied in First Amendment
cases”).
98 See 497 U.S. 62, 94 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Kelley v. Johnson, 425
U.S. 238, 247 (1976) (upholding hair grooming regulation for police under
substantive due process after finding clear, rational connection between regulation
and promotion of safety of persons and property)).
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circumstances government employees may have their property
searched without violating the Fourth Amendment.99 Additionally,
governmental entities may more easily conduct drug testing of public
employees who are engaged in safety sensitive or confidential
positions.100 This is because “in certain limited circumstances, the
Government’s need to discover such latent or hidden conditions, or to
prevent their development, is sufficiently compelling to justify the
intrusion on privacy entailed by conducting such searches without any
measure of individualized suspicion.”101
Scalia also notes in his Rutan dissent that in the Fifth Amendment
context the government cannot force private citizens to provide
information that incriminates them.
Government employees,
however, can be dismissed from employment when the incriminating
information in question is related to their job performance.102 Finally,
in the substantive due process area pre-Lawrence, public employers
historically could regulate such things as their police officers’
grooming practices.103 Consequently, pre-Lawrence and outside of the
First Amendment, there was little protection for the constitutional
rights for public employees.104 Indeed, even looking beyond Supreme
Court cases to lower court decisions, there appears to be little

99 See id. (citing plurality opinion in O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723
(1987)).
100 See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 664
(1989) (permitting drug testing of federal custom agents who interdict drugs or carry
weapons); Knox County Educ. Ass’n. v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361, 384
(6th Cir. 1998) (upholding policy of suspicionless drug testing for all individuals who
apply for, transfer to, or are promoted to “safety sensitive” positions within school
system, including teaching positions).
101 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668.
102 See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 94-95 (citing Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 277-78
(1968)).
103 See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976).
104 Although Kelley v. Johnson did involve the application of substantive due
process to an unconstitutional condition in public employment case, it only applied a
pre-Lawrence, traditional rational basis review analysis. See Kelley, 425 U.S. at 247-48.
In fact, the Supreme Court failed to grant certiorari in two cases concerning the right
to decisional non-interference in private affairs in the early 1980s. See Rowland v.
Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1011 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (describing case upholding firing of public high school teacher
who was terminated for mere fact of being bisexual); Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464
U.S. 965, 965 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (discussing
case upholding firing of male police sergeant and female patrol office for engaging in
romantic relationship together).
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protection for non-First Amendment rights, like substantive due
process rights.105
The lack of unconstitutional conditions in employment cases
outside of the First Amendment is puzzling. There does not seem to
be any good analytical reason why this is so, except for the most
obvious reason that this is the context where most public employee
cases arise. Perhaps, however, this current state of affairs will become
an anachronism with the additional emphasis being placed on
interests in employee decisional autonomy in light of Lawrence v.
Texas.106
Consistent with this line of thought, the next section argues that
recent developments in substantive due process law, ushered in by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence, should lead to a reinvigoration
of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in employment outside
of the First Amendment in cases involving public employees’ interests
in decisional non-interference in private affairs. Before discussing the
fundamental changes brought about by Lawrence, however, it is first
necessary to place Lawrence in historical context. This chronological
approach will provide further insight into how Lawrence represents
the adoption of a particular view of the liberty interest contained
within the federal Constitution’s due process clause. It is to that task
that this paper now turns.
II.

LAWRENCE AND THE RIGHT TO DECISIONAL NON-INTERFERENCE IN
PRIVATE AFFAIRS

A. The Various Incomplete Incarnations of the Right to Decisional NonInterference Prior to Lawrence v. Texas
Since Brandeis and Warren wrote their famous article in 1890 about
privacy rights,107 the only thing that commentators seem to agree on
concerning the right to privacy is that there is very little agreement
about its contours.108 It is not my goal here to suggest a theory or
taxonomy of privacy.109 Rather, this section discusses an individual’s
See supra discussion accompanying note 97.
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
107 See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
108 See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1099-1124
(2002) (cataloging different conceptions of privacy that various courts and
commentators have championed).
109 For a recent attempt at a pragmatic theory of privacy, see, for example, id. at
105
106
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interest in decisional non-interference in private affairs, and the
various labels and methods which courts have utilized to protect these
decisional autonomy interests prior to Lawrence.110 Specifically, this
section categorizes the various approaches to decisional noninterference as part of the jurisprudences of: (1) the right to be let
alone; (2) the right to personhood; and (3) the right to intimacy or
intimate association.
1.

The Right to Be Let Alone

The place to start this discussion, as always, must be with the
seminal Brandeis and Warren article.111 Prior to this time, the Court
only recognized constitutional privacy rights stemming directly from
concrete and explicit constitutional provisions addressing privacy
concerns in particular contexts, and then only rarely.112 Brandeis and
Warren talked of privacy generally as “a right to be let alone” by the
government.113 To them, and to us today no less, a sphere of personal
autonomy or “personality” exists upon which the government should
1090-91 (developing theory of privacy based on Wittgenstein’s notion of “family
resemblance”).
110 Here, I rely upon Solove’s taxonomy for privacy for the different types of
decisional non-interference. See id. at 1092; see also Solove, supra note 14, at 557
(offering that under this more recent contextual taxonomy, violation of these types of
“privacy rights” would be referred to as “decisional interference in private affairs”).
Each of these categories, however, is not mutually exclusive and relies upon one
another to varying degree under different conceptions of privacy. See Solove, supra
note 108, at 1116.
111 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 107, at 193.
112 Such individual constitutional provisions recognized prior to 1890 included the
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment, and the right not to be forced to incriminate oneself under the Fifth
Amendment. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886) (“For the
‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost
always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself,
which in criminal cases is condemned in the [F]ifth [A]mendment; and compelling a
man ‘in a criminal case to be a witness against himself,’ which is condemned in the
[F]ifth [A]mendment, throws light on the question as to what is an ‘unreasonable
search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”)
113 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 107, at 193. The Supreme Court utilized
this definition of privacy a number of times shortly after the article was published.
See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (concerning right to bodily
integrity with regard to compulsory vaccination law); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (stating that person had right to be let alone where issue was
whether plaintiff could be forced to undergo surgical examination). Even so, the
references to a “right to be let alone” in Supreme Court jurisprudence were relatively
rare until after World War II.
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not be able to tread arbitrarily.114 Of course, this very idea of the
unencumbered individual sprang directly from more generic forms of
classical liberalism.115 In turn, classical liberalism finds its root in
John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty116 and its most vivid expression in Justice
Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead v. United States:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They
recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in
material things. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let
alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men.117
All that being said, the right to be let alone did not gain substantial
traction in constitutional thought until after World War II.118 Indeed,
earlier cases had been generally abysmal with regard to individual
autonomy and dignity, as is no better demonstrated than by Justice
Holmes’s infamous 1927 opinion in Buck v. Bell regarding the
necessary sterilization of “imbeciles.”119

See Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1052 (contending that American life is animated
by presumptive libertarian mentality: “Libertarian is the presumption that the state
leaves us alone to choose our own path to happiness”); Warren & Brandeis, supra
note 107, at 205-06 (noting that privacy was based on principle “of inviolate
personality” and that there is “a general right to privacy for thoughts, emotions, and
sensations”); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (holding that
individuals have “fundamental . . . right to be free, except in very limited
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy”).
115 By classical liberalism, I simply mean a political philosophy that endorses a
conception of liberty as the absence of interference. See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of
Liberty, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 15, 16 (Michael Sandel ed., 1984).
116 See Secunda, supra note 40, at 118, 118 n.2 (discussing John Stuart Mill’s On
Liberty).
117 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
118 As one indicia of its increasing presence, the “right to be let alone” language
was utilized only three times prior to 1946, but 42 times since according to a recent
Westlaw query. See online search, www.westlaw.com, Supreme Court database
(SCT), “da (before 1946) & ‘right to be let alone’” (Oct. 6, 2006); online search,
www.westlaw.com, Supreme Court database (SCT), “da (after 1945) & ‘right to be let
alone’” (Oct. 6, 2006).
119 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding compulsory sterilization legislation as
constitutional and stating that “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough”).
114
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Despite some fits and starts, the crucial break in the constitutional
levee came in the 1965 landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut.120 In
Griswold, the Court located a constitutional right to privacy within the
penumbras of the Bill of Rights.121 Suffice it to say that this case’s
recognition of constitutionally recognized zones of privacy, unhinged
from any one constitutional anchor, dramatically changed the Court’s
orientation concerning individual rights to be free from arbitrary
government interference.122 Although Griswold itself only struck
down anti-contraception laws for married couples,123 its greater import
derived from its rooting the right to be let alone within the very
structure and fiber of the Federal Constitution.124
Consequently, it could not be considered surprising when,
thereafter, the right recognized in Griswold was extended to some
non-married individuals in Eisenstadt v. Baird125 and to additional
individuals under the age of sixteen in Carey v. Population Services
International.126 And not only was this zone of privacy found to exist
in the sacred quarters of the marital bedroom,127 it was also decisively
extended to more transcendental spheres with the recognition of a
woman’s right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy in Roe v.

381 U.S. 479, 479 (1965).
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (“The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life and substance.”); see also id. at 486, 488 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (locating right to privacy in Ninth Amendment’s reservation of certain
fundamental rights to people); id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding privacy right
as “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”) (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937)). But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605-06 (2003) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (maintaining no general right to privacy in Constitution).
122 See Robert Misner, Minimalism, Desuetude, and Fornication, 35 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 1, 25-26 (1999) (discussing impact of Griswold decision on constitutional
privacy law).
123 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
124 Id. at 485 (“The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the
zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.”).
125 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972).
126 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977).
127 For a discussion of the importance of the conception of the home to historical
constitutional privacy jurisprudence pre-Lawrence, see discussion infra note 170 and
accompanying text. See also Marc Stein, Boutilier and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Sexual
Revolution, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 491, 535 (2005) (maintaining that based on its
rulings from 1965 to 1973, “the [United States Supreme] Court’s vision of sexual
citizenship was not libertarian or egalitarian . . . [but] was based on a doctrine that
privileged adult, heterosexual, monogamous, marital, familial, domestic, private, and
procreative forms of sexual expression.”).
120
121
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Wade.128 Indeed, Roe decisively located these rights within the liberty
interest contained in the substantive component of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.129 In this sense, Roe
v. Wade signaled the culmination of a vision of privacy as a right to be
let alone (now phrased as the “right to choose”) first discussed in
Brandeis and Warren’s Harvard Law Review piece from 1890.
2.

The Right to Personhood: Individuality, Dignity, and
Autonomy

The Court has not only sought to describe an individual’s right to be
free from arbitrary government interference by merely relying upon
Justice Brandeis’s vivid language in Olmstead concerning the “right to
be let alone.” It has also done so in those substantive due process
cases which see the essence of the privacy right revolving around
personhood, or more specifically, as involving themes of individuality,
dignity, and autonomy.130 As Professor Solove explains, basing privacy
on conceptions of personhood differs from other conceptions of
privacy because personhood conceptions focus on the normative good
“of the protection of the integrity of the personality.”131
Griswold, Eisenstadt, Carey, and Roe all have at their core this
conception of privacy as well.132 More importantly for purposes of this
128 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (“[A] right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of
certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.”).
129 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
In line with locating these rights within the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause, Justice Harlan famously wrote in
another case:

[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot
be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees
elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This “liberty” is not a series of
isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of
speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational
continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints . . . and which also
recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain
interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to
justify their abridgment.
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (internal citations
omitted).
130 See Solove, supra note 108, at 1116-19.
131 Id. at 1116.
132 Id. at 1117 (“[T]hese cases involved decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing.”). Indeed, this line of
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paper and its focus on decisional autonomy, however, is the case of
Whalen v. Roe. In Whalen, the Court tied this conception of privacy as
personhood to an individual’s right to be free from arbitrary
governmental interference with regard to an individual’s freedom in
making certain fundamental life decisions.133
More recently, this idea of privacy found its most “elegant
encapsulation”134 in Justices O’Connor, Souter, and Kennedy’s joint
opinion in the pivotal 1992 case Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey.135 In the now famous “sweet-mystery-of-life”
passage, derided by Justice Scalia and other commentators,136 these
three Justices found that:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.137

substantive due process cases pre-dates even the Olmstead dissent. See, e.g., Pierce v.
Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (finding
interest of parents in being able to send their children to private school to inhere
within substantive due process); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding
that Constitution’s protection of liberty encompasses interest of parents in having
their children learn German).
133 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600; see also Solove, supra note 108, at
1117 (“[T]he Court has conceptualized the protection of privacy as the state’s noninterference in certain decisions that are essential in defining personhood.”).
134 See Robert E. Toone, The Incoherence of Defendant Autonomy, 83 N.C. L. REV.
621, 655-56 (2005) (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992)).
135 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
136 For examples of Justice Scalia’s and other commentators’ distaste of this
phrasing, see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Dwight G. Duncan, The Federal Marriage Amendment and Rule by Judges, 27 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 543, 558-59 (2004); James E. Fleming, Lawrence’s Republic, 39 TULSA L.
REV. 563, 574-75 (2004). See also Toone, supra note 134, at 655-56 (remarking that
Justice Scalia’s derision notwithstanding, many have found “right to define one’s own
concept of existence” formulation to be valuable).
137 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (joint opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter) (emphasis added). It is significant to note that the Casey joint opinion did not
receive majority support in placing this type of all-encompassing liberty squarely
within the substantive component of the Due Process Clauses. Indeed, this
conception based on individual autonomy and dignity remained a minority view of
the Court until Lawrence. See Secunda, supra note 40, at 135 n.84.
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Nevertheless, prior to Lawrence, the scope of the personhood rights
recognized by the joint opinion in Casey appeared to be largely limited
by the “history and tradition” test of Washington v. Glucksberg, a case
dealing with the right to physician-assisted suicide.138 There, the
Court appeared to draw back from the broad conception of individual
liberty from governmental interference set forth by the Casey plurality.
In Glucksberg, the Court found that the State of Washington’s ban on
assisted suicide did not violate individuals’ due process rights because
such laws were rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose.139 In denying that such laws interfered with the fundamental
rights of individuals, the Court employed a substantive due process
analysis which considered whether there was a careful description of
an asserted right that was one of “those fundamental rights and
liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in the Nation’s history
and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that
neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”140
Finding that our nation’s history did not enshrine such a right to
physician-assisted suicide, the Court found there was no fundamental
right to assisted suicide under due process and upheld the Washington
ban of physician-assisted suicide under rational basis review.141
Consequently, as late as 1997, far from embracing the comprehensive
notion of individual liberty to be free from governmental interference
in making important life decisions embodied by Whalen and the joint
opinion in Casey, the Supreme Court in Glucksberg appeared to be in
the process of substantially narrowing the scope of its substantive due
process jurisprudence.142
Similarly, in the realm of intimate
association rights, and as described in the next subsection, an
analogous limiting of the right to decisional non-interference in
private affairs was also underway.

521 U.S. 702 (1997).
Id. at 735.
140 Id. at 720-21 (internal citations omitted).
141 Id. at 728. As I have argued in a previous article, this stultifying view of the
contours of substantive due process has been criticized by Supreme Court Justices and
commentators as inconsistent with a broader and more appropriate view of freedom
from governmental interference. See Secunda, supra note 40, at 129 n.52.
142 Accord Note, Assessing the Viability of a Substantive Due Process Right to In Vitro
Fertilization, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2792, 2798 (2005) (“Glucksberg’s ‘careful description’
test reflected the Court’s tendency, evinced in prior cases, toward narrow definition of
the right in question as a means of checking the expansion of the Court’s substantive
due process jurisprudence.”).
138
139
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The Right to Intimacy and Intimate Association

Closely connected to the right of personhood is the right to intimacy
or intimate association. The plurality in Casey’s “sweet-mystery-oflife” passage utilized the word “intimate” to help define the
constitutional interests at stake.143 Further, almost a decade earlier in
Roberts v. United States Jaycees,144 the Court recognized an important
distinction between First Amendment rights of expressive
association145 and rights of intimate association under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.146 The latter rights recognize “that,
because the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it
must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly
personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from
unjustified interference by the State.”147 The Roberts Court defined a
central aspect of an individual’s freedom from decisional noninterference in private, intimate association as the ability to form and
maintain human bonds unmolested by the State.
The Court
concluded that, “[p]rotecting these [intimate] relationships from
unwarranted state interference . . . safeguards the ability
independently to define one’s identity that is central to any concept of
liberty.”148
Despite Roberts’s seemingly strong endorsement of a right to
intimate association and the concomitant freedom from unwarranted
state interference, prior to Lawrence at least one significant Supreme
Court case, Bowers v. Hardwick,149 discounted the importance of such
human relationships. Bowers held, of course, that there is no
143 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (joint
opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter).
144 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
145 See generally Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the First Person Plural: Expressive
Associations and the First Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483 (2001) (discussing in
comprehensive detail right to expressive association under First Amendment).
146 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18.
147 See id. at 618 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) and
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)); id. at 619 (“Moreover, the
constitutional shelter afforded such relationships reflects the realization that
individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others.”).
The citation to these older cases clearly places the freedom of intimate association
within substantive due process jurisprudence, rather than the First Amendment.
148 Id. at 619. Indeed, as Solove has explained, the important distinction between
the liberty of personhood versus the liberty of intimacy is the difference between selfcreation and autonomy on the one hand, and the importance of human relationships
to all individuals on the other. See Solove, supra note 108, at 1121.
149 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

2006]

The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence

115

constitutional right to engage in homosexual sodomy.150 Through
Justice White’s narrow conception of the individual interest involved
in Bowers as pure sexual gratification through the act of anal or oral
intercourse in a homosexual relationship, the Court limited the scope
of the liberty interest found in the Due Process Clause.151 That is, the
Court failed to recognize that meaningful personal relationships are
necessarily made up of both sexual and non-sexual dimensions, all for
the larger individual pursuit of happiness.152
Consequently, prior to June 2003, no comprehensive conception of
decisional autonomy in private affairs existed which recognized an
individual’s right to self-definition, as well as his or her right to engage
in the process of self-definition through development of personal
relationships with others. To the extent that such a right to decisional
non-interference in private affairs was recognized, as it was in the
1977 case of Whalen v. Roe,153 it did not seem to be afforded any type
of heightened protection from governmental incursions. Finally,
although past Supreme Court decisions recognized this type of liberty
interest to some degree, the Court continued to struggle to define the
more esoteric and non-material aspects of these liberty interests. In
sum, the existing contours of the jurisprudential privacy terrain when
the Court decided Lawrence in June 2003 in no way predicted the
seismic shift in this area of privacy law that Lawrence wrought.
B. Lawrence v. Texas and the Fulfillment of Olmstead’s Legacy
Lawrence,154 a criminal case from the state of Texas involving the
application of that state’s sodomy statute to the private sexual
activities of two consenting adult homosexuals, changed everything.
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Lawrence greatly altered the
substantive due process constitutional landscape by striking down the
Texas anti-sodomy statute and reemphasizing the importance of
providing a haven from state interference to individuals when such
individuals seek to make private and personal decisions pertaining to
Id. at 190-91.
See Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1032 (denominating Justice White’s opinion for
Court as “brusque” and “limit[ing] the Court’s previous privacy precedents to
situations unique to heterosexual couples (marriage, procreation, family)”).
152 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s
spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.”).
153 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977).
154 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
150
151
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sex. Importantly, Lawrence expands notions of the individual right to
decisional non-interference in private affairs just when cases such as
Bowers and Glucksberg were substantially limiting such notions.
Lawrence’s central holding is that the Texas sodomy statute at issue
furthered no legitimate state interest which could justify its intrusion
into the personal and private lives of the homosexual individuals
criminally sanctioned under that law.155 The decision is the first time
a majority of the Supreme Court unabashedly accepted in one case a
conception of privacy that included an individual’s rights to be let
alone, to personhood, and to intimacy.156 In particular, by expressly
overruling Bowers157 and, to a lesser extent, by failing to even mention
Glucksberg as binding precedent,158 the Supreme Court put forward a
novel type of substantive due process analysis.159 Even though
Lawrence clearly relied on Griswold, Roe, and Casey in coming to its
conclusion,160 the key additional step taken by Justice Kennedy’s
opinion is to recognize a transcendental, non-material aspect to these
types of liberty interests, consistent with the Olmstead and Poe dissents
of bygone days.161

155 Id. at 578.
See also Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1056 (reading underlying
message of Lawrence and Romer as: “The state cannot create a pariah class of useful,
productive citizens and deny them a broad range of legal rights and protections simply
because their presumed private activities are disgusting to other citizens”).
156 Although a similar conception of decisional autonomy in private affairs was
considered in Casey, it was not adopted by a majority of the court. See supra note 137
and accompanying text.
157 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
158 See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The Fundamental Right That Dare
Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004) (maintaining that “the
[Lawrence] Court gave short shrift to the notion that it was under some obligation to
confine its implementation of substantive due process to the largely mechanical
exercise of isolating ‘fundamental rights’ as though they were a historically given set of
data points on a two-dimensional grid”).
159 Accord Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture,
Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 97 (2003) (“Themes of respect and stigma are at
the moral center of the Lawrence opinion, and they are entirely new to substantive due
process doctrine.”).
160 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-66. See also Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1012 (“One
cannot interpret or apply Lawrence without situating it in history.”).
161 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (“Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds.
Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,
expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the
person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.”); see also Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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My purpose here, however, is not to undertake an extensive analysis
of what Lawrence does and does not hold. I already weighed in on
that debate,162 and it will no doubt continue to percolate, at least until
the Supreme Court takes another case discussing the scope of its
Lawrence holding.163 Rather, my enterprise here is much more
modest. I merely wish to emphasize a point on which most
commentators on all sides of the debate seem to agree; that is,
Lawrence attaches some form of heightened review when the
government seeks to interfere with the private and personal lives of
individuals.164 Although it is true that various forms of heightened
scrutiny, including strict scrutiny, have been applied in the past with
regard to specific rights within the context of the rights to be let alone,
to personhood, and to intimate association, this article makes the
162 Accord State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 30, 34 (Kan. 2005) (finding that Lawrence
majority, by discussing equal protection analysis in Romer and by discussing
inevitably linked nature of equal protection and due process analysis in cases such as
these, “at least implied that the rational basis test is the appropriate standard”); see
Secunda, supra note 40, at 125-36 (maintaining that Lawrence Court applied “rational
review with bite” scrutiny in overturning Texas sodomy statute).
163 See Secunda, supra note 40, at 162.
164 See, e.g., Marybeth Herald, A Bedroom of One’s Own: Morality and Sexual Privacy
After Lawrence v. Texas, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 29-32 (2004) (arguing that
Lawrence is an “elegant discourse on individual autonomy and liberty” and that some
form of heightened review is involved); Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88
MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1116-17 (2004) (reading Lawrence to extend meaningful
constitutional protection to liberty interests without denominating them fundamental
rights); Victor C. Romero, An “Other” Christian Perspective on Lawrence, 45 J. CATH.
LEG. STUDS. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at n.29, on file with author) (finding that
Lawrence Court’s use of “rational basis” refers to “rational basis with bite” because
evidence in case suggests irrational discrimination or animus) (citing Gerald Gunther,
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-24 (1972)); Tribe, supra note 158, at 1899
(arguing that Court in Lawrence “implicitly reject[ed] the notion that its task was
simply to name the specific activities textually or historically treated as protected,”
and treated doctrine of substantive due process as reflecting “a deeper pattern
involving the allocation of decisionmaking roles”); Martin A. Schwartz, Constitutional
Basis of Lawrence v. Texas, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 14, 2003, at 3 (concluding that Lawrence
Court relied on “important low-level scrutiny”); see also Williams v. Attorney Gen. of
Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1251 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Lawrence denominated fundamental right to sexual privacy); State v. Limon, 122 P.3d
22, 24, 29 (Kan. 2005) (applying Lawrence and reading it as applying heightened form
of rational basis review, rather than strict scrutiny analysis reserved for fundamental
rights or suspect classifications, in case involving Kansas’s criminal Romeo and Juliet
statute, which contained different penalties for heterosexual and homosexual statutory
rape); Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140, 1155 (2004)
(interpreting Lawrence to hold that right to private, intimate association is
fundamental right).
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crucial point that Lawrence represents the first time a majority of the
Court recognized a comprehensive preferred interest in decisional
non-interference in private affairs due heightened scrutiny.165 And as
a preferred liberty interest, governmental infringements of an
individual’s interests in decisional non-interference in private affairs
must involve the balancing of governmental efficiency concerns
against an individual’s interest in being free from governmental
interference in her personal and private life.166 Indeed, this is the very
same balancing test that the Court already utilized throughout its
unconstitutional conditions in employment cases discussed in section
I above.167
Therefore, until disavowed by a subsequent Supreme Court
decision, Lawrence stands, at the very least, for an analytical approach
that requires a heightened form of judicial scrutiny whenever the
government seeks to interfere with the private and personal decisions
of adult individuals.168 In other words, Lawrence “presumes an
autonomy of self,”169 with the government’s having to put forward a
legitimate and substantial interest to interfere with the personal and
private decisional conduct of individuals.170 As a result, the right to
165 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“Their right to liberty under the Due Process
Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the
government. ‘It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal
liberty which the government may not enter.’”) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992)); see also Stein, supra note 127, at 536 (“[I]n
Lawrence the Court struck down state sodomy laws, reinterpreting Griswold,
Eisenstadt, and Roe in ways that reject . . . the earlier Court’s view that there is no right
to engage in sex outside of marriage.”).
166 See Secunda, supra note 40, at 136-38.
167 See supra Part I.B.2.
168 At the same time, Lawrence is equally clear concerning what it does not touch
upon:

The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who
might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where
consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or
prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must give formal
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. Thus, cases involving kids, prostitution, and drugs are
generally not covered by the rights described in Lawrence. But see Limon, 122 P.3d at
24, 29 (finding that Kansas’s criminal Romeo and Juliet statute, which contained
different penalties for heterosexual and homosexual statutory rape, lacked rational
basis under guidance of Lawrence).
169 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
170 Unlike some other commentators, I do not believe the right described by
Lawrence is limited to private conduct that takes place in the sanctity of the home. See
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decisional non-interference in private affairs may now take its rightful
place next to other “preferred” constitutional interests, and, when
infringed in relation to the granting of government benefits, must be
analyzed under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
The next section contends that this monumental constitutional
development in the area of substantive due process requires nothing
less than a reformulation of the appropriate unconstitutional
conditions test to protect these emerging constitutional interests.
III. THE IMPACT OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS ON THE DOCTRINE OF
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
As previously illustrated, First Amendment considerations by and
large limited the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.171 Now, after
Lawrence, there is a new type of constitutional liberty interest: the
interest in decisional non-interference in private affairs, which is
subject to some form of heightened judicial review. As a result, public
employers should show legitimate and substantial interests before
interfering with the personal and private lives of their employees. The
next two sections elaborate on the inadequacy of the current First
Amendment Connick/Pickering analysis for vindicating these public
employee interests in decisional non-interference. In its stead, they
propose a modified Pickering test, which is consistent with other

Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 1399, 1400-01 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence relies on narrow version of liberty
that is both “geographized and domesticated”). Lawrence derives from cases where
home and sex play a large role. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)
(“Moreover, in the context of this case — a prosecution for mere possession of printed
or filmed matter in the privacy of a person’s own home — that right takes on an added
dimension. For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.”);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (“Would we allow the police to
search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraceptives?”). Lawrence, however, is more in the tradition of Olmstead and the
joint opinion in Casey in describing a liberty interest which is transcendental and nonmaterial in its dimensions. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (“The instant case involves
liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.”)
(emphasis added); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)
(joint opinion) (“At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”); Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The [founding
fathers] knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be
found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.”).
171 See supra Part I.C.
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A. The Incongruence Between the Interest in Decisional Non-Interference
in Private Affairs and the Connick/Pickering Analysis
Quite simply put, the current First Amendment model for public
employee speech rights is inadequate to vindicate individuals’ interests
in decisional non-interference in private affairs because of the public
concern test. As set out above, the current Connick/Pickering analysis
requires at the threshold, in most cases,172 that a court consider
whether the public employee is speaking out on a matter of public
concern.173 Needless to say, these same concerns normally do not
justify a public concern test in the post-Lawrence substantive due
process rights context. Here, the issue is not the ability of the public
employees to speak out or express themselves on pressing social,
political, or communal issues,174 but, quite to the contrary, the ability
to retain a modicum of autonomy and personal space without
jeopardizing one’s public employment. In this regard, a case in which
a public employer seeks to make a female employee marry her live-in
boyfriend or else face discharge from her job does not implicate any
real First Amendment rights. Consequently, the test for post-Lawrence
substantive due process rights envisioned here does not include the
public concern test.175
172 But see Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1961-62 (2006) (holding that
public employee official capacity speech not protected by First Amendment regardless
of whether speech involves matter of public concern). In light of Ceballos, there
appears to be even more reason to develop an alternative constitutional test to protect
these newly emergent substantive due process rights.
173 See supra Part I.B.2.
174 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (“When employee expression
cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other
concern to community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing
their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in name of First
Amendment.”).
175 Some may argue that something like a threshold test for Lawrence right cases is
needed to properly take into account the increased leeway that government has in its
employer capacity. Nonetheless, not all constitutional balancing tests have a
threshold test like the public concern test. Indeed, the privacy interests of public
employees under the Fourth Amendment have been subjected to a balancing test
without the use of any gate-keeping or threshold test. See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (applying balancing test in
deciding whether drug testing of custom agents was constitutional under Fourth
Amendment); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-18 (1989)
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This is not to say that there might not be the infrequent case in
which a public employee will be able to call upon both her First
Amendment expression rights and Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process rights. This is because there could be
instances where an employee is both seeking to express herself on a
matter of public concern, while at the same time seeking a measure of
personal space for her private conduct.176 For an example of one of
these rare cases, consider Melzer v. Board of Education (NAMBLA),177
which concerned the rights of a public school teacher pedophile to
advocate on his free time for the legalization of man-boy sexual
relationships.178 Not only were his First Amendment free speech
rights at issue under Connick/Pickering,179 but one could argue that his
interest in decisional non-interference in private affairs might have
also been at stake, as long as he was not seeking to commit the
criminal act of child molestation.180 On the other hand, there appear

(applying balancing test to determine whether drug testing of railroad employees
recently involved in accidents is constitutional under Fourth Amendment); Knox
County Educ. Ass’n v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 1998)
(applying balancing test to determine whether public high school teachers could be
tested for drugs consistent with Fourth Amendment).
176 It appears that if one had the choice of frameworks, one might choose the
Connick/Pickering line of cases because these cases recognize that political speech is at
the heart of the First Amendment. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 145 (“The explanation for
the Constitution’s special concern with threats to the right of citizens to participate in
political affairs is no mystery. The First Amendment ‘was fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people.’”) (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)). On the other hand, although this
article maintains that there is a heightened interest surrounding the right to decisional
non-interference in private affairs after Lawrence, the relative importance of these
rights on the constitutional spectrum still remains to be determined and, thus, is
almost certainly not at the level of political speech rights.
177 See 336 F.3d 185, 188-89 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1183 (2004).
NAMBLA refers to the “North American Man/Boy Love Association.”
178 See id.
179 Indeed, the NAMBLA member, Melzer, lost his case under the Connick/Pickering
analysis. See id. at 200.
180 To be clear, this analysis assumes, as the Court did, that Melzer did not base his
claim on the right to engage in criminal pedophilia. See id. at 189 (“[T]he record
before us reveals no evidence that plaintiff engaged in any illegal or inappropriate
conduct at [his public school]. Plaintiff’s outlet as a pedophile is his participation in
NAMBLA, which he joined in 1979 or 1980 to discuss with others his long-standing
attraction to young boys.”). If Melzer had engaged in such criminal conduct away
from work, his actions would not be saved by his heightened substantive due process
under Lawrence. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 577, 578 (2003) (“The present case
does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced
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to be abundant factual scenarios under which interests in decisional
non-interference in private affairs will be the only way to vindicate a
public employee’s constitutional rights.181
In short, the point of this brief section is merely to make evident
what may already be obvious to many. An employee’s interest in
decisional non-interference by her employer may infrequently be
synonymous with that employee’s First Amendment rights.
Nevertheless, there is a substantially larger category of cases in which
the employee can only depend on an interest in decisional noninterference in private affairs. It is these cases which require a
reconstructed doctrinal model to vindicate these post-Lawrence
substantive due process rights.
B. A New Model: The Modified Pickering Analysis
1.

The Basics

Even without the public concern test of Connick, the Pickering
balancing test must be altered to meet the decisional autonomy
concerns of public employees. As presently stated, the test balances
the interests of the employee as citizen in speaking out on matters of
public concern and the state’s interest as an employer in running an
efficient government service.182 The state’s interests in this regard
generally remain the same183 and, more specifically, include the
government’s interest in having loyal subordinates, in having coworkers who can work together, in maintaining a favorable public
image in the community, and in fulfilling its public mission.184

or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused.”).
181 Some common examples would include instances in which public employees
were terminated from their jobs for having a live-in boyfriend, being gay, for seeking
an abortion, or for using contraception. Other examples might include instances in
which a public employee is fired for visiting a gay bar, participating in an adult
Internet chat room, or for engaging in even more risqué off-duty conduct. See infra
Part III.B.
182 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
183 See Solove, supra note 14, at 2 (observing that governmental interests in such
balancing tests “are often much more readily articulated”).
184 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S.
at 570-73). As Kozel has perceptively argued, Pickering is really about an employee
not engaging in speech or conduct which causes a substantial disruption to the
employer. See Kozel, supra note 79, at 1019 (“The Pickering/Connick doctrine
collapses into little more than the constitutionalization of a heckler’s veto.”); see also
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (also relying upon
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On the other side of the ledger, the employee’s interests need to be
substantially redefined. The emphasis is no longer on the ability of
the employee-citizens to speak out or express themselves on matters of
public concern. Instead, the issue is being free from unwanted
governmental intrusions with respect to decisions relating to matters
concerning one’s private and personal life, especially in matters
pertaining to sex.185 Specifically, a government employee should be
able “to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted
governmental intrusions into [his or her] privacy.”186 Moreover, there
should be a “zone of autonomy, of presumptive immunity to
governmental regulation.”187 As such, anytime the government as
employer seeks to justify an intrusion into an employee’s sacrosanct
zone of decisional non-interference, a legitimate and substantial
justification must be set forth.188
Thus, the modified Pickering balancing test for public employees’
substantive due process rights should balance the employee’s interest
as citizen in being free from unwanted and unjustified governmental
intrusions into the employee’s personal and private life against the
government’s interest as employer in running an efficient
governmental service for the public’s benefit.189 At times, this balance
will obviously be strongly in favor of either the government or the
employee, depending on whether the employee’s off-duty actions have
any impact on the employer. If there is no impact, analogizing to the
Court’s conclusion in NTEU,190 the employee’s interests will normally
prevail.191 Also, easy cases will involve instances in which the
“substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities” in regulating
political speech of students in school).
185 See Solove, supra note 14, at 555-62.
186 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (discussing privacy rights in
First Amendment context).
187 See Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1411 (1974)
(emphasis added).
188 See supra note 16.
189 To reiterate, even though the Pickering case analogy is utilized to label this test,
the modified Pickering analysis would only apply to constitutional balancing of
employees’ substantive due process rights and government employers’ efficiency
concerns, not to First Amendment cases concerning freedom of speech, expression, or
association. See supra note 20.
190 See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454,
465 (1995) (finding that employee speech had no adverse impact on government
employment, and, thus, government had no legitimate interest in regulating employee
speech).
191 See id. (“Neither the character of the authors, the subject matter of their
expression, the effect of the content of their expression on their official duties, nor the
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employee is engaging in a certain line of private conduct explicitly not
protected by Lawrence, such as cases involving minors or commercial
conduct like prostitution.192
The more numerous and difficult cases will fall somewhere in
between these antipodes. For these more intricate cases, it is helpful
to consider the “nexus test” used for employee discharges by labor
arbitrators in the union environment. As described elsewhere,193 the
general principle is that an employer should not be able to interfere
with an employee’s life outside of work unless there is more than a de
minimis adverse impact on the employer’s work place.194 This impact
can be measured based on the detriment to the employer’s public
image, the inability of the worker to interact with her co-employees, or
the employee’s simple inability to carry out the essential functions of
her position as a result of her private conduct.195 But outside of these
types of legitimate and substantial justifications for interference in an
employee’s private life, a government employer should be constrained
by the liberty interest contained in the substantive component of the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from
interfering with their employees’ personal and private lives.
2.

The Coherency Between the Modified Pickering Test and Other
Constitutional Protections Afforded Public Employees

In establishing this modified Pickering analysis to protect the
interests of public employees in decisional non-interference in private
affairs, this article by no means draws upon a blank slate. Instead, it

kind of audiences they address have any relevance to their employment.”).
192 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
193 See Paul M. Secunda, Getting to the Nexus of the Matter: A Sliding Scale Approach
to Faculty-Student Consensual Relationship Policies in Higher Education, 55 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 55, 68-73 (2004).
194 See id. at 69; see also Kozel, supra note 79, at 1051 (noting that Supreme Court
has made distinction in public employee speech cases based on whether speech or
expression in question included any indicia of speaker’s employment).
195 See Secunda, supra note 193, at 70 (citing W.E. Caldwell Co., 28 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 434, 436-37 (1957) (Kesselman, Arb.)). Compare Bd. of County Comm’rs v.
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (“The government needs to be free to terminate
both employees and contractors for poor performance, to improve the efficiency,
efficacy, and responsiveness of service to the public, and to prevent the appearance of
corruption.”), with Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he Government’s interest . . . is the maintenance of employee
efficiency and discipline. . . . To this end, the Government, as an employer, must have
wide discretion and control over the management of its personnel and internal
affairs.”).
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takes its cues directly from other areas of constitutional law in which
the constitutional rights of public employees are also at stake.
In this regard, one needs look no further for an apt analogy than
cases concerning the permissibility of drug testing public
employees.196 Although these cases involve a Fourth Amendment
analysis regarding the reasonableness of the search and seizure
involved,197 many of the same concerns animating the discussion in
this paper are also apparent in the Fourth Amendment context.
For example, in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, the
question presented was whether federal custom agents could be
subjected to drug urinalysis testing as a condition of their being
promoted or transferred.198 Using the administrative search criterion
and the “special needs” test under the Fourth Amendment,199 the court
engaged in a constitutional balancing test based on a reasonableness
standard.200 The court noted that the immediacy of the government’s
196 See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679
(1989) (permitting suspicionless drug search of Federal Customs agents); Skinner v.
Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989) (upholding federal regulations
requiring employees of private railroads to produce urine samples for drug testing
upon occurrence of accident); Knox County Educ. Ass’n v. Knox County Bd. of
Educ., 158 F.3d 361, 384 (6th Cir. 1998) (permitting drug testing of public school
teachers), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 812 (1999). But cf. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305,
322 (1997) (striking down drug testing requirements for candidates for high public
office in Georgia).
197 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search and seizure, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.”). The Supreme Court has already settled that the Fourth
Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches conducted by the
government, even when the government acts as an employer. See O’Connor v. Ortega,
480 U.S. 709, 714-15 (1987) (plurality opinion).
198 489 U.S. at 659.
199 A government search must normally be supported by a warrant issued upon
probable cause. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987). However, neither
a warrant nor probable cause, nor any measure of individualized suspicion, is an
indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance. See New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
506-61 (1976). In administrative searches, for instance, the government is able to
proceed without a search warrant when the “special needs” of the search so require.
See, e.g., Ortega, 480 U.S. at 722 (need of employer to enter employee’s office, desk, or
files comprises “special need” and no warrant is required); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341
(finding warrant requirement unsuited to school context because it unduly interferes
with maintenance of swift and informal disciplinary procedures).
200 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66 (“Where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves
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concern and the minimal nature of the intrusion outweighed the
individual’s privacy interest and permitted the government to drug test
custom agents.201 The importance in ensuring that these federal
employees were drug free was paramount because these custom
officers carried guns and interdicted drugs.202
Similarly, in the context of substantive due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment, a comparable, finely attuned balancing of
interests test could be applied. As in Von Raab, the context of the
employee’s job should be given substantial weight in determining the
justification of an intrusion.203 For instance, police officers and other
public officials who deal with guns and other sensitive information
could be subjected to more intrusive searches than, say, your average
civilian clerk for a municipality.204 On the other hand, especially after
Lawrence, just because an employee is employed by law enforcement
does not mean that the employer should dictate every aspect of how
that employee chooses to live her private life.205 In fact, Lawrence itself
makes clear that the morality of one’s employer will generally not be
sufficient to outweigh an employee’s substantial interests in making
important life decisions unrestricted by governmental interference.206

special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is
necessary to balance the individual’s privacy expectations against the Government’s
interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of
individualized suspicion in the particular context.”).
201 Id. at 677 (“In sum, we believe the Government has demonstrated that its
compelling interests in safeguarding our borders and the public safety outweigh the
privacy expectations of employees who seek to be promoted to positions that directly
involve the interdiction of illegal drugs or that require the incumbent to carry a
firearm.”).
202 See id. at 672 (“We think Customs employees who are directly involved in the
interdiction of illegal drugs or who are required to carry firearms in the line of duty
likewise have a diminished expectation of privacy in respect to the intrusions
occasioned by a urine test.”).
203 See id. at 671 (“[I]t is plain that certain forms of public employment may
diminish privacy expectations even with respect to such personal searches.”).
204 Accord id. at 671 (“Employees of the United States Mint, for example, should
expect to be subject to certain routine personal searches when they leave the
workplace every day. Similarly, those who join our military or intelligence services
may not only be required to give what in other contexts might be viewed as
extraordinary assurances of trustworthiness and probity, but also may expect intrusive
inquiries into their physical fitness for those special positions.”).
205 See Hartsoe, supra note 96, at A06 (describing actions of North Carolina sheriff
in forcing dispatcher to choose between her job and living together with her
boyfriend).
206 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78 (upholding Justice Stevens’s view in his
Bowers dissent that “the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally
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In short, current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence surrounding
drug testing of public employees lends support to the modified
Pickering analysis articulated in this paper.
IV. APPLYING THE MODIFIED PICKERING TEST: OF PORNOGRAPHIC
POLICEMEN, SWINGING SCHOOL TEACHERS, AND SALACIOUS SHERIFF
DISPATCHERS
How will the modified Pickering balance actually work in practice?
In order to see how this new analysis will play out in a real world case,
one only has to look at the case of the pornographic policeman.
Therefore, the first section of this Part asks whether this new test
would have made any difference in the outcome of City of San Diego v.
Roe. Concluding that the outcome of this case would most likely have
been the same, the second section predicts that the ascendancy of
public employees’ interests in decisional non-interference in private
affairs post-Lawrence will greatly increase their protection from
illegitimate and arbitrary interference into their private and personal
lives by their government employers.
A. Of Pornographic Policemen
1.

Applying the Connick/Pickering First Amendment Analysis

To jog the reader’s memory, the case of the pornographic policeman
in San Diego v. Roe207 involved whether John Roe could engage in
pornographic activities outside of his police work.208 The Supreme
Court carried out a straightforward First Amendment
Connick/Pickering analysis.209 More specifically, the Court concluded
that John Roe’s conduct did not deserve First Amendment protection

viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice”).
207 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curiam).
208 See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
209 In applying the Connick/Pickering analysis to this case, the Court found that the
NTEU case does not stand for the proposition that “off-the-job, non-employmentrelated speech should generally merit strong protection under the Pickering balancing
test.” See Kozel, supra note 79, at 1050. Instead, the John Roe Court foreclosed the
idea that NTEU created a presumption in favor of protecting off-duty speech or
expression by refusing to apply NTEU to the facts of John Roe. See John Roe, 543 U.S.
at 81-82. The important distinction between the two cases is that NTEU involved
speech on matters of public concern while John Roe clearly did not. See id.
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under either the NTEU or Connick/Pickering line of cases.210
Under NTEU, involving the honoraria ban for federal employees, the
Court observed that even if one concedes that John Roe was speaking
on a matter of public concern, which he was not, NTEU is not the
appropriate precedent.211 That is because the speech and expression of
the federal employees in NTEU had absolutely nothing to do with their
federal employment.212 Of course, it goes without saying that under
such circumstances, the balance between government interests and
employee interests swings wildly in the employee’s favor. On the
other hand, John Roe unstintingly attempted to take advantage of his
status as a law enforcement officer to pad his own pocket through
pornographic activities. For instance, not only was John Roe selling
old San Diego police uniforms on eBay,213 but he listed in his personal
profile online that he was “employed in the field of law
enforcement.”214 Also, and quite damningly, the pornographic tape
that he unwittingly sold to an undercover detective depicted him in a
non-affiliated police uniform engaging in police activities and sex acts
at the same time.215 Finally, even though John Roe used a fake AOL
account name and did not disclose his name on eBay (going so far as
to set up a private mailbox for his pornographic business in northern
California),216 he was readily identifiable by individuals who worked
with him (including the sergeant who reported him).217
Moreover, and as the John Roe Court actually held, John Roe’s
conduct clearly did not “qualify as a matter of public concern under
any view of the public concern test.”218 Thus, under both NTEU and
Connick/Pickering, the per curiam decision is rightly decided under the
First Amendment.

See id.
See id. (“The present case falls outside the protection afforded in NTEU.”).
212 See id. at 81 (“The Court [in NTEU] . . . observed that none of the speech at
issue ‘even arguably [had] any adverse impact’ on the employer.”) (quoting United
States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995)).
213 See id. at 78.
214 Id.
215 See id. at 79. In particular, the video in question showed John Roe, initially in
police uniform, issuing a traffic ticket, only to revoke it after stripping and
masturbating in front of the ticketed driver. See id.
216 See id. at 78; Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari at *2, *6, City of San
Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (No. 03-1669), 2004 WL 1877785.
217 See John Roe, 543 U.S. at 78.
218 See id. at 84.
210
211
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Applying the Modified Pickering Test to John Roe’s Substantive
Due Process Rights

What if the Court considered John Roe’s interest in decisional noninterference in private affairs?219 Would the case have had a different
outcome? Most likely not. Although there would have been some
obvious differences in the analysis,220 the problem with the John Roe
case under the modified Pickering analysis is similar to those endemic
to any type of constitutional balancing test: the more unpopular or
disruptive the public employee’s off-duty conduct to the employer’s
workplace, the more likely that the Pickering balance will favor the
employer’s efficiency interests.221 The knowledge of John Roe’s offduty pornographic conduct would have caused a significant disruption
in the San Diego police department. Thus, it is likely that any interest
in decisional non-interference in private affairs that John Roe had
would have been outweighed by his employer’s legitimate and
substantial efficiency interests.222
Perhaps even more importantly, the John Roe facts differ from the
substantive due process rights upheld in Lawrence in at least four
important ways. First, the conduct in question did not occur in the
privacy of John Roe’s home.223 The Supreme Court appears most
comfortable upholding liberty interests under substantive due process
when the privacy of the home is involved.224 Second, producing the
John Roe filed his complaint in the Southern District of California on September
28, 2001. See Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing in Support of Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari at *4, City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (No. 03-1669), 2004
WL 1378662. Consequently, John Roe’s attorney did not have Lawrence-based
arguments at his disposal initially and would have been foreclosed from bringing up
any such new legal theories of recovery for the first time on appeal.
220 Most obviously, John Roe would not have been thrown out of court on the
relatively easy ground that his conduct was not within the traditional realm of public
concern.
Moreover, rather than focusing on speech rights under the First
Amendment, the Court under the proposed test would have had to instead focus on
John Roe’s rights to decisional non-interference in private affairs.
221 See Kozel, supra note 79, at 1018-19.
222 Roe is an even less sympathetic plaintiff because he transparently attempted to
use the fact of his police department employment to his private advantage and to his
employer’s detriment. See John Roe, 543 U.S. at 84.
223 As discussed above, the Supreme Court has placed significant emphasis on
whether conduct was engaged in by individuals in the privacy of their home. See
supra note 170 and accompanying text.
224 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (“Would we
allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of
the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy
surrounding the marriage relationship.”); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
219
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type of pornography that John Roe produced does not involve
engaging in an intimate, sexual relationship as part of forging a
meaningful human relationship as Lawrence did.225 Third, law
enforcement officers, because of the nature of their responsibilities, are
given far less leeway in their off-duty conduct than other types of
government workers.226 Finally, John Roe’s conduct in producing and
distributing the pornographic videotapes was both public and
commercial at the same time and, therefore, unlikely even to be
covered by the interests recognized in Lawrence.227
In short, John Roe would have most likely lost his case even if his
interest in decisional non-interference in private affairs had been taken
into account under a modified Pickering test. This is because, as
demonstrated above, the government’s efficiency concerns would
remain at a high level, and, if anything, John Roe’s interest in
decisional non-interference in private affairs would be minimal given
the facts of the case.
B. Of Swinging School Teachers and Salacious Sheriff Dispatchers
Just because our pornographic policeman does not benefit from the
doctrinal innovation introduced in this paper, it does not mean that
other public employees will not gain important, additional
constitutional protections which they currently do not have under the
First Amendment Connick/Pickering analysis. In order to discern the
impact that the modified Pickering analysis and these interests in
decisional non-interference in private affairs will have on public
employees’ substantive due process rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, it is necessary to turn to a consideration of a
number of real world and hypothetical cases to flesh out the contours
of this analysis.

U.S. 49, 65 (1973) (finding that constitutional “privacy right encompasses and
protects the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood,
procreation, and child rearing”); Stein, supra note 127, at 535.
225 In pre-Lawrence terminology, the right to intimacy is lacking since Roe’s
conduct did not include the forging of the bonds of a personal relationship. See supra
Part II.A.3.
226 See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1976) (“[The law enforcement]
employer has, in accordance with its well-established duty to keep the peace, placed
myriad demands upon the members of the police force, duties which have no
counterpart with respect to the public at large.”).
227 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The present case does not
involve . . . public conduct or prostitution.”).
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The Easier Cases Under the Modified Pickering Analysis: The
Sheriff Dispatcher

The easier cases under the modified Pickering analysis will involve
well-established privacy rights that public employees had preLawrence. For instance, an employer would run afoul of an
employee’s interest in decisional non-interference in private affairs if
the employer discharged the employee for using contraception or for
having an abortion.228 Now, post-Lawrence, easier cases should also
include those in which someone is fired for being homosexual or, for
that matter, having any private relationships between consenting
adults that do not adversely impact the participants’ employment.229
The North Carolina cohabitation case currently being litigated by
the ACLU is another prime example.230 There, a female sheriff
dispatcher, who lived with her boyfriend, claimed that she was forced
to quit her job by the sheriff when she would not either marry her
boyfriend or move out of the house.231 In support of his position, the
sheriff relied upon an 1805 “adultery and fornication” statute which
prohibited cohabitation of unmarried persons.232 The pending lawsuit
228 These would be relatively straightforward unconstitutional conditions cases
because the government as employer would be seeking to prevent conduct indirectly,
i.e., the use of contraception or abortion, which it could not prevent directly through
the conditioning of a government benefit, i.e., government employment. See Sullivan,
supra note 29, at 1422 (“Unconstitutional conditions problems arise when
government offers a benefit on condition that the recipient perform or forego an
activity that a preferred constitutional right normally protects from government
interference.”).
229 Recall again the case in which a female attorney in the employ of the infamous
Bowers was fired for being a lesbian. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1100 (11th
Cir. 1997). In 1997, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the discharge of that attorney under
a very deferential rational basis review analysis following the Bowers precedent. See
id. at 1109-11. Post-Lawrence, a court’s consideration of a public employee’s right to
decisional non-interference in private affairs should make firing for being gay or
lesbian an illegitimate and arbitrary factor upon which to base a discharge, and, in
such cases, the modified Pickering balance would come out in favor of the employee.
Accord Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1056 (arguing that, after Lawrence, state cannot tell
gay people “that they are presumptive outlaws who can for that reason be denied civil
service employment, licenses, and various state benefits. Nor can the state tell gay
people that the price of citizenship for them is to remain in the closet”); id. at 1058
(“[M]ost of the state and local discriminations explicitly targeting lesbian and gay
citizens ought to be suspect after Romer and Lawrence.”).
230 See Hartsoe, supra note 96, at A06.
231 See id.
232 See id. The North Carolina “fornication and adultery” statute states: “If any
man and woman, not being married to each other, shall lewdly and lasciviously
associate, bed and cohabit together, they shall be guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor . . .
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challenges the continuing validity of such cohabitation statutes postLawrence.233
Because Lawrence itself deals with consensual sex between two
individuals in the privacy of their home,234 and because there are
potential criminal sanctions at stake for violating the cohabitation
statute in question,235 there can be little doubt that this case will be
directly controlled by reference to the substantive due process rights
discussed in Lawrence. In this vein, and in the language of the
modified Pickering test, the government employer cannot condition
the benefit of public employment on an employee’s sacrificing her
right to engage in a private relationship, especially when that
relationship has no nexus to the employee’s work duties.236 Notice
this would be true whether that relationship involved a heterosexual
or homosexual relationship, or for that matter, a married or unmarried
couple. Thus, under the modified Pickering analysis, because the
government’s interest in interfering with its employee’s interest in
decisional non-interference in private affairs is not supported by a
legitimate or substantial justification outside of the state’s own moral
proclivities concerning unmarried men and women living together,237
the government’s efficiency interests would be clearly outweighed by
the individual’s interest in decisional non-interference in private
affairs.
2.

The More Difficult Cases Under the Modified Pickering
Analysis: The Swinging School Teacher

Unfortunately, many of the future cases involving interests in
decisional non-interference will not involve the easier type of
scenarios described in the previous section. Instead, the majority of
.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2005).
233 See Hartsoe, supra note 96, at A06.
234 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (observing “emerging
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex”).
235 § 14-184.
236 See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
237 Lawrence makes clear that the promotion of a majoritarian morality is not a
sufficient government interest to outweigh an individual’s right to freely exercise her
rights to decisional non-interference in private affairs. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003) (adopting Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 215-20 (1986)); see also Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1045 (observing
that Court in Lawrence found that popular disgust of homosexual sodomy could not
supply rational basis under Due Process Clause for criminalizing homosexual
sodomy).
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these cases will likely require a careful analysis of both the
governmental interests in efficiency and freedom from disruption on
the one hand, and the strength of the employee’s post-Lawrence
substantive due process rights on the other. A few examples will
suffice to establish some of the analytical intricacies that will no doubt
occur in these complicated cases.
For instance, consider the difficulties with any activity that a public
employee engages in on his private or personal time that brings great
notoriety to his employer. In these cases, it is more likely that the
employee would lose any subsequent constitutional balancing, as the
disruption entailed by the employee’s private conduct would likely
overshadow any interest in decisional non-interference that an
employee might have.238 In this regard, consider a police officer who
in his spare time is a porn star. Regardless of the nature of the
employee interests involved, the need to maintain the credibility of its
police officers and its own reputation will probably permit the
employer to take constitutionally permissible, adverse employment
actions against that employee.239 Likewise, the same outcome would
result in a case involving a public elementary school teacher who is
exposed publicly as engaging in a swinger lifestyle outside of school.
Because of the sensitive nature of the public school teacher’s position
and the importance for these individuals to model appropriate
behavior for children,240 the efficiency concerns of the public employer
will most likely outweigh the teacher’s decisional autonomy interests
in these circumstances as well.
Consider another difficult set of facts. John Doe is still a police
officer, and thus more highly regulated, but, unlike John Roe, he does
not engage in pornographic activities. Instead, he films himself and
his wife engaging in consensual sexual intercourse for their private
use, but unfortunately the videotape is stolen by an acquaintance and
ends up being distributed widely on the Internet. When the police
department learns of the tape and the adverse reaction the tape is
See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84-85 (2004) (per curiam) (stressing
importance of impact of public employee’s private conduct on “mission and
functions” of public employer in this type of unconstitutional conditions analysis);
United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995)
(observing that none of speech at issue “even arguably [had] any adverse impact on
the [employer]”).
240 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Schs., 533 U.S. 98, 116 (2001) (observing
“that students are susceptible to pressure in the classroom, particularly given their
possible reliance on teachers as role models”) (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S.
578, 584 (1987)).
238
239

134

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 40:085

causing in the community, the police officer is fired. Under a
modified Pickering analysis, can this police officer be constitutionally
discharged?
On the one hand, the carrying out of a personal relationship,
especially in the marital bedroom,241 is due much freedom from
governmental incursions.242 Moreover, the police officer did not wish
for this tape to become public and the tape became public through no
efforts of his own. On the other hand, regardless of the police officer’s
desire not to have this videotape placed on the Internet, the fact of the
matter is that it now exists in cyberspace, and the officer’s credibility
and that of his department are on the line. If the police department
can show substantial disruptions to its operations and that a public
safety issue has now arisen as a result of the distractions caused by the
scandal, the department will most likely be able to discharge the
officer. Nonetheless, this type of case will no doubt require a careful
balancing by the court and may turn on such case-sensitive factors as
the size of the municipality, the extent of the public’s knowledge of
the tape, and the type of sexual conduct displayed on the videotape.
Similarly, more difficult issues arise when a public employee acts as
the public face of the employer. This is because of the potential
message the employer is sending to the public by keeping the
employee in employment after the employee engages in the
controversial conduct.243 For instance, what if the police chief is
caught engaging in an extramarital affair off-duty and this conduct is
made public. Does the employer, for efficiency reasons, have more
latitude to terminate the chief, even though the chief would appear to
have post-Lawrence substantive due process rights to engage in
consensual sexual relations with another person on his own time?244
Does it depend on the geographic location in which the scenario
occurs and that community’s mores? Perhaps a police chief in a small,
conservative town would be discharged, while a police chief in a large,
See supra note 170.
See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965); see also supra note 224 and accompanying
text.
243 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) (“The Boy Scouts has a
First Amendment right to choose to send one message but not the other.”). It is
anything but clear if government institutions are expressive associations, but even if
they are not, the modified Pickering analysis would still give credence to government
efficiency concerns, which would include the government employer’s right to
maintain a certain image or reputation within a community.
244 This scenario assumes there are no applicable statutory or common law
prohibitions against engaging in extra-marital relationships.
241
242
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liberal metropolitan city would face no adverse employment action.
Should the constitutional interests in decisional non-interference in
private affairs differ in different parts of the country?245 These are all
very difficult questions which lower courts will have to weigh in
deciding these complex cases.
In short, there may sometimes be no clear-cut answers to the
complex questions posed by these post-Lawrence cases. Nevertheless,
public employees are no doubt better off as a whole as a result of
Lawrence and its elevation of the right to decisional non-interference
in private affairs to a preferred constitutional liberty interest. To what
extent public employees are better off will depend to a large extent on
how the lower federal courts interpret the scope of these interests in
the coming years. But at the very least, Lawrence, with the aid of the
modified Pickering test, should provide much greater protection to
public employees against arbitrary and meddlesome government
overreaching that unnecessarily treads into the secret regions of their
lives.
CONCLUSION
This paper argues that whatever debates continue to stew regarding
the “true” meaning of Lawrence v. Texas, at the very least, Lawrence
represents the recognition of an individual’s heightened interest in
decisional non-interference in private affairs.246 This is an important
constitutional development since a problem under the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions only arises when the government offers a
benefit, like government employment, conditioned on the waiver of a
preferred constitutional right. Thus, post-Lawrence, the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions should prohibit a government employer
from firing a government employee who exercises her interests in
decisional non-interference in private affairs.
The current protections for public employee speech rights under the
Connick/Pickering analysis, however, do not adequately safeguard
245 Such an outcome would place these cases in a category similar to First
Amendment obscenity cases in which courts utilize, in part, a contemporary
community standards test. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (“The
basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether ‘the average person, applying
contemporary community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest.”).
246 Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1012 (“[F]ew constitutional scholars think the
narrowest or the broadest reading of Lawrence is correct. Its charged reasoning cannot
be limited to the sodomy context alone, but neither does it entail same-sex
marriage.”).
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these emerging interests in decisional non-interference. The proposed
modified Pickering test discards the unnecessary “public concern test”
for these post-Lawrence substantive due process cases and, in the first
instance, balances the employee’s interest in decisional noninterference in private affairs against the government’s interest in
operating an efficient governmental service for the public. The
upshot, and a much neglected impact of Lawrence, is that over twentyone million federal, state, and local United States’ employees should be
the beneficiaries in coming years of a significant expansion of their
interests in being free from arbitrary and capricious interference by
their employers in their personal and private lives.

